





This essay is a review of the recent literature on the methodology of econom-
ics, with a focus on three broad trends that have defined the core lines
of research within the discipline during the last two decades. These trends
are: (a) the philosophical analysis of economic modelling and economic
explanation; (b) the epistemology of causal inference, evidence diversity and
evidence-based policy and (c) the investigation of the methodological under-
pinnings and public policy implications of behavioural economics. The final
output is inevitably not exhaustive, yet it aims at offering a fair taste of
some of the most representative questions in the field on which many philoso-
phers, methodologists and social scientists have recently been placing a great
deal of intellectual effort. The topics and references compiled in this review
should serve at least as safe introductions to some of the central research
questions in the philosophy and methodology of economics.
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It is almost 40 years since modern texts explicitly devoted to the philosophy
and methodology of economics began to appear. Many changes in the topics of
research have occurred during this short period, some of them related to direct
changes in economic theory and practice, while others have been by-products
of recent developments in the philosophy of science (see Hands, 2015a). Four
decades ago, only a handful of economists and philosophers of science were
interested in discussing epistemological issues related to economics. Today,
journals and institutes specialised in research combining philosophy and eco-
nomics have emerged and thrived. Moreover, a continuously growing number
of graduate students trained in philosophy, economics, history, sociology, polit-
ical science, statistics, and so on, now explicitly aim at engaging with the wide
range of socially relevant issues studied under the label of philosophy of
economics.
This essay is an attempt to showcase some of the most significant current
topics of research in the methodology and philosophy of economics. Given the
constantly increasing amount of contributions to the discipline, several topics
and many recent high-quality and innovative pieces of research unfortunately
had to be left out. So, this is a patently non-exhaustive and selective literature
review. Here I offer a brief description of the selection criteria.
I have grouped the topics into three broad trends of research: (1) modelling
and explanation in economics, (2) causality and evidence in economics and
(3) issues concerning behavioural economics. Obviously, there are other trends
going on, yet these are three of the most commonly and extensively researched
areas in current economic methodology. I have usually followed the chronolog-
ical development of the accounts and debates to guide the narrative of the
story. Although, admittedly, in many cases there is no proper story yet to be
told, but only rather intriguing open questions.
In general, I have included mostly works published during the last 15 years,
yet I made a number of exceptions by including a few older books or articles
that are essential to properly understand the origins of certain topics of discus-
sion. My hope is that mentioning a few foundational texts connected to current
debates will be useful to readers who are not yet very familiar with philosophy
of economics.
In relation to the specific contents and details of the material, I aimed at
including the most representative pieces on each question or debate, and also
those which offer good summaries of the specialised literature on their respec-
tive topics. I tried to avoid including ‘purely’ philosophical contributions
or pieces which merely use economic examples or economic ideas to illustrate
highly abstract philosophical points. Instead I focused on literature that
engages with epistemological issues that are characteristic in economics or that
have implications for scientific and policy-oriented economic practice.
Finally, my own familiarity with the relevant literature and my philosophical
interests are unavoidably reflected in the final selection of the reviewed mate-
rial. Nonetheless, even if there could be reservations about the merits of my
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selection criteria, I genuinely believe that all the manuscripts I have included
are exemplary of the excellent academic standards currently ruling in the field,
and that all of them will be highly fruitful and rewarding readings to any philo-
sophically minded social researcher.
MODELLING AND EXPLANATION IN ECONOMICS
One of the concerns that has motivated the most philosophical reflection and
controversy about modelling in economics seems to be the wish to come to
terms with falsehood. J. S. Mill’s (1844 [1830]) methodological appraisal of eco-
nomics is already, to a great extent, an attempt to justify how false and abstract
conceptualisations of economic agents and phenomena can possibly be the
source of reliable scientific knowledge. The same aspiration, namely to offer a
justification of how economics can be epistemically valuable in spite of being
theoretically founded on false propositions (idealisations, abstractions, analo-
gies, conjectures and the like) is clearly behind other classical methodological
elucidations, such as Friedman’s (1953), Gibbard and Varian’s (1978), or
Musgrave’s (1981). How can models constructed on unrealistic foundations
be of any use to explaining, understanding or predicting real economic
phenomena?
Philosophical accounts about modelling, explanation, understanding, truth-
fulness and realisticness in economics have certainly proliferated in the last dec-
ades. Of course, the question about how false models can lead to reliable
scientific knowledge is not a concern exclusive to economics. Most philosophers
of science seem to agree that, for better or worse, there is no meaningful way to
come up with the perfect ‘picture’ of reality by using our subjective scientific
constructs (see, e.g. Cartwright, 1983; Dupré 1993; Teller, 2001; van Fraassen,
1980). The only special aspect about modelling in economics is, perhaps, that in
contrast to all other sciences, theoretical economic results are often shamelessly
presented and celebrated as if there was nothing more to the practice of eco-
nomics apart from cultivating and elevating the craft of formal modelling (see
Colander, 2010; Hodgson, 2009; Pfleiderer, 2014; Romer, 2015).
The recent philosophical research on economic modelling has been directly
influenced by the literature on scientific representation in the philosophy of sci-
ence (some very influential pieces are, e.g. Giere, 2006; Suppes, 2002; van
Fraassen, 2008; Weisberg, 2013; Wimsatt, 2007). Well-known general accounts
that sparked initial debate within economic methodology are Hausman’s
(1992), and Mäki’s (1992, 1994, 2004) characterisations of economics and
modelling. Both accounts were, if not influenced, at least very much in line with
a perspectivist view of scientific modelling, like that hoisted by Giere (1990,
2004, 2006). Agents use models to represent some aspects of economic phenom-
ena to some relevant extent, for particular epistemic purposes.
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Mäki has argued that a model’s main epistemic function is to isolate relevant
aspects of the phenomena under study by means of idealisations and abstrac-
tions. His account of modelling as isolation has continued developing through-
out the years and has evolved in content and sophistication. In Mäki’s most
recent account, Giere’s four elements of representation, namely ‘agents’,
‘models’, ‘targets’ and ‘purposes’, are supplemented by ‘audiences’ to whom the
model is intended to serve, and ‘commentaries’ whereby modellers address all
sorts of issues and clarifications about the intended resemblance and represen-
tativeness of the model (see Mäki, 2009, 2011). But perhaps not all economics
can be encompassed by the practice of isolating. As a counterexample to
Mäki’s characterisation of modelling in economics, Alexandrova (2006) has
suggested that the case of the actual design of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) telecommunication auctions constitutes an instance of eco-
nomics being successfully applied without using the method of isolation.
Knuuttila (2009) has compared two alternative approaches to economic
modelling, the ‘isolationist view’ and what she calls the ‘credible constructions’
approach. The former approach is meant to isolate causal relations and
mechanisms that are supposed to be at work in reality (e.g. Mäki, 1992, 2004),
the latter is meant to build ‘hypothetical’ models from which potential credible
inferences can be drawn (e.g. Sugden, 2000). She suggests that the construction-
ist perspective can better accommodate the way scientists actually learn when
using models. Also, Grüne-Yanoff (2011) has questioned Mäki’s isolationist
account of economic modelling. After pondering some counterexamples, he
concludes that model building cannot be exhaustively described by the method
of isolation, and that the outcomes of models are also not isolations. Morgan
(2012) provides a full-fledged (historical and methodological) account about
the building of models, using different modelling strategies (which include
imagining, caricaturising, idealising and so forth), and she elaborates on how
economists have used them in a variety of ways to reason and to make infer-
ences (see also Morgan, 2015; Morgan & Knuuttila, 2012).
Recently, the very idea that a theory of representation is necessary to under-
stand scientific modelling has been put into question in the philosophy of sci-
ence (see Morrison, 2015). Yet, the discussion of models in economics has for
the most part taken for granted that models are epistemically valuable in virtue
of being ‘representational’ tools. Grüne-Yanoff (2009, 2013) has challenged this
generalised idea, and characterised so-called ‘minimal models’ as theoretical
models which contribute in different valuable ways to how scientists learn
about real-world phenomena (see also Claveau & Vergara Fernández, 2015;
Thoma, 2016), even if such models do not hold any traditional representational
relation to the world. Indeed, many theoretical models could be characterised
as minimal models in the sense just described. However, Fumagalli (2016a)
has recently argued against the possibility of actually learning anything from
such minimal models.
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Modelling Assumptions and Robustness Analysis
Another closely related traditional topic of debate in relation to economic mod-
els is the realisticness (or the lack thereof) of assumptions (e.g. Cartwright,
2006a; Hindriks, 2006; Mäki, 2000). False assumptions in models are not prob-
lematic, as long as they are negligible or irrelevant to the model’s main results
(Mäki, 2006). Assumptions that have a direct effect or are responsible for the
model’s result are labelled as ‘substantial’. Only substantial assumptions are the
ones carrying some truth about the relevant target phenomena. The straightfor-
ward questions to ask then are: how can economists tell which assumptions are
substantial and which are not? And whenever economic models fail or are
shown to be wrong, how do economists know which assumptions are to be
blamed and discarded or revised?
In a relatively recent article, Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, and Marchionni (2010)
noticed that most of economic theorising consists in building models with
slightly different assumptions, and yet generate the same theoretical result.
Inspired by Wimsatt’s (2007) ideas on robustness, they argue that such type of
theoretical modelling is a form of derivational robustness analysis whereby
economists attempt to test which assumptions are substantial and which are
not. Again, substantial assumptions are those which make a difference to the
theoretical result when they are changed or relaxed. Thus, there is some episte-
mic gain in theoretical modelling by simply allowing economists to tell apart
the relevant assumptions from those that are irrelevant to the derived results.
As a reaction, Odenbaugh and Alexandrova (2011) have pointed out that
robustness analysis provides economists with a tool for discovery, yet not for
empirical confirmation. Theoretical models are open templates (or ‘open for-
mulae’) which can be used to build hypotheses about the mechanisms at work
in real-life phenomena. Derivational robustness analysis at best offers econo-
mists a way to discriminate among the wide array of different explanatory
templates in relation to a particular target (see also Alexandrova, 2008;
Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, & Marchionni, 2012). Houkes and Vaesen (2012) also
contest that robustness analysis can have confirmatory power and identify two
alternative roles for it.
In contrast, Lehtinen (2016, 2017) argues that there is in fact some confirma-
tory import in robustness analysis. In some cases, he argues, the validity of a
theoretical result becomes more solid as a consequence of what he calls ‘indirect
confirmation’. Broadly put, the idea is that an assumption A1 in one model can
receive some indirect confirmation after the result of a different model (but one
in which A1 also features) is empirically confirmed.
This debate on the epistemic virtues of robustness analysis opened up a
number of interesting questions about the ways in which modelling practices
actually contribute to science. How can one be sure that derivational robustness
is not leading modellers (unknowingly) to be more prone to confirm one result
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over another? Can derivational robustness analysis really be a method of con-
firmation? What are the implications for economic theorising? Are economists
really engaging in such analysis when they build models, or is robustness analy-
sis only an as-if characterisation of what they do? Should assumptions be tested
against other assumptions or against empirical facts?
Derivational robustness analysis has been mostly discussed as an aspect of
scientific modelling in general, so recent philosophical contributions to the issue
(which are highly relevant to understanding the implications of robustness for
economics) have mainly been published in general philosophy of science venues
(see, e.g. Forber, 2010; Lloyd, 2015; Parker, 2011; Raerinne, 2013; Weisberg,
2013). For a comprehensive analysis of the problem of robustness in science, in
general, see the edited volume by Soler, Trizio, Nickles, and Wimsatt (2012).
In a very recent contribution, Lisciandra (2017) clarifies different connota-
tions of derivational robustness and points to some problems that such analysis
might have when scientists are unable to only slightly alter the models that are
to be compared. Using examples from biology and economics, she puts forward
that the problem of how to properly compare the results from structurally dif-
ferent models remains open to further philosophical investigation.
Modelling and Explanation
Questions about whether and how models can contribute to scientific explana-
tions have been discussed for a long time in the philosophy of science (for
recent relevant treatments, see Batterman & Rice, 2014; Bokulich, 2011;
Kennedy, 2012; Kuorikoski & Ylikoski, 2015; Rice, 2015). Standard accounts
of explanation suggest that successful explanations increase in one way or
another our understanding of the phenomena to be explained (see, e.g. de Regt,
2009; Hindriks, 2013; Strevens, 2013; Trout, 2007). Given the longstanding
worry about the falsehood that is inherent in economic models, the existing
philosophical inquiries about explanation are especially relevant for economic
methodologists. How can economic models ‘explain’ or ‘be useful to providing
explanations’ when they contain mostly blatantly false assumptions?
Some recent attempts to account for the explanatory import of economic
models are Mäki’s (2009, 2011, 2017) account of models as credible surrogate
systems (already mentioned above), and Sugden’s (2000, 2009, 2011) view of
theoretical economic models as useful ‘credible worlds’. Somewhat counterintu-
itively, but perhaps very much in accordance with what economic theorists
actually try to do, Sugden (2011) argues that there is some epistemic value in
creating theoretical ‘credible model worlds’ to study regularities that operate
within those theoretical constructs, even before finding any regularities in the
real world that the models could potentially help explaining.
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In contrast, Alexandrova (2008) has given an account of models as templates
(‘open formulae’), which totally rejects the claim that models are explanatory
(see also Alexandrova & Northcott, 2009, 2013). Rather, models play a heuris-
tic role in the conjecture of causal hypotheses, which would then still require
further empirical confirmation in order to establish theoretical results as scien-
tific knowledge.
The debates about the explanatory power of models in economics became
fairly noticeable in the methodological arena after the publication of an article
by Reiss (2012) titled ‘The explanation paradox’. First, Reiss discusses (drawing
from Wimsatt, 2007) different types of ‘false’ idealisations as they are typically
employed in economic modelling, and observes that in spite of including false-
hood, economic models are thought to be explanatory. Then he proposes what
he calls a paradox as follows (Reiss, 2012, p. 49): (1) Economic models are
false. (2) Economic models are nevertheless explanatory. (3) Only true accounts
can explain.
The rest of the article is an appraisal of the different attempts that have been
made to deal with or to get rid of each of these premises (trying to avoid the para-
dox) in the literature on economic modelling. Reiss ponders and finds lacking
existing accounts of how models with false assumptions can be truthful (e.g.
Mäki, 2009, 2011), about how models need not be explanatory (e. g. Alexandrova,
2008), and about how it can be possible to explain real world phenomena from
theoretical constructs that are not truthful (e.g. Sugden, 2011). His conclusion
is that the paradox is genuine and that, for the moment, the only response to it
‘is to remain baffled’ (Reiss, 2012, p. 59).
Independently of accepting its main proposal or not, Reiss’s article is a great
critical exposition of some of the most influential recent ideas about economic
modelling. Furthermore, it has kindled more debate among methodologists on
each of the issues that the alleged paradox highlights. The first reactions to
Reiss’s article by Alexandrova, Northcott, Grüne-Yanoff, Hausman, Mäki,
Rol and Sugden   followed by Reiss’s response   can be found in a special
issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology (vol. 20, issue 3, 2013).
There are also some recent proposals suggesting that the epistemic import of
economic models consists in providing some form of how-possibly explanations,
in contrast to how-actually explanations (e.g. Aydınonat, 2007; Grüne-Yanoff,
2009, 2013; Hands, 2016; Rohwer & Rice, 2013). How-possibly explanations
need not be true about the explanandum, but only hypothetical and credible
under certain conditions. This would justify, for instance, the existence, and
high appreciation, of some theoretical models which are extremely formal and
obviously not meant to provide actual explanations of anything. According
to Verreault-Julien (2017), there can even be cases of economic models which
can provide understanding, even when they provide neither actual nor
possible explanations. Purely mathematical models, he argues, such as the
Arrow Debreu model, provide mathematical how-possibly explanations
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which, in turn, increase our understanding by establishing claims of mathemati-
cal dependence.
Methodological discussions, however, have tended to assess the potential
epistemic virtues of economic models by studying one type or one particular
‘famous’ model in isolation. As a recent proposal, Ylikoski and Aydınonat
(2014) suggest that in actual scientific practice, models are typically developed,
modified, and refined in clusters that share a ‘common core’ of assumptions.
Understanding the epistemic virtues of modelling, then, requires understanding
how families of models evolve.
There is very little philosophical research about how clusters of models are
used to generate explanations, especially of economic phenomena. It follows
from Ylikoski and Aydınonat’s account that the answer to ‘how do economists
explain?’ is that they employ clusters of multiple models, rather than a single
one, to construct explanations of economic phenomena. Interestingly, this
account is in various essential respects closer to what economic practitioners
actually believe to be the essence of economic modelling (see, e.g. Aydınonat,
2017; Rodrik, 2015).
CAUSAL INFERENCE AND EVIDENCE IN ECONOMICS
As is well known, Hume and J. S. Mill were two of the first philosopher-
economists to display a deep interest in the nature and epistemology of
causation. Knowledge about causal relations is valuable for explanatory and
instrumental purposes. Understanding the causes of phenomena gives us predic-
tive and controlling powers. In Mill’s words, ‘of all truths relating to phenom-
ena’ knowledge about causation is ‘the most valuable to us’, because we base on
it ‘every reasonable anticipation of future facts, and whatever power we possess
of influencing those facts to our advantage’ (Mill, 1874 [1843], 3.5.1).
During the 20th century, philosophers interested in causality typically
focused their attention on related, but fundamentally distinct types of ques-
tions, including conceptual and semantic questions such as ‘what do “cause”
and “causing” mean?’ (e.g. Ducasse, 1926; Lewis, 1973; Russell, 1912 1913) or
‘what is the logical form of a causal claim?’ (e.g. Davidson, 1967); ontological
questions like ‘is there causation in the real world?’ and ‘what is the nature of
causation?’ (e.g. Dowe, 2000; Menzies, 1989; Salmon, 1980) and epistemologi-
cal questions such as ‘how can one distinguish, find, and learn about causal
relations?’ (e.g. Pearl, 2000; Simon, 1954; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 1993;
Suppes, 1970).
The mysterious and elusive ontological nature of causation has for a long
time made economists shun causal talk. In general, the metaphysics of causa-
tion remains an unsettled issue and a persistent topic of debate among philoso-
phers up until the present day (see, e.g. Beebee, Hitchcock, & Menzies, 2009;
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Price & Corry, 2007). Nevertheless, as univocal and reductionist projects about
the nature of causality began to fade away at the turn of the 20th century, and
different pluralistic approaches began to emerge (see Campaner & Galavotti,
2007; Cartwright, 2004; Hitchcock, 2003; Psillos, 2009), the philosophical focus
of investigation also moved from ontological worries towards projects con-
cerned with developing and improving ways to reliably find causal relations,
that is methods of causal inference.
It is this latter epistemological angle about causation which has gradually
and increasingly been reintroduced into economics and other social sciences
during the last decades (see Heckman, 2000; Hoover, 2001; Morgan, 2013).
Reiss’s (2015) recent monograph is a neat introduction to the different theories
of causality, to causal pluralism, and to the philosophical relevance of causal
inference to the social sciences. Nowadays, causal notions and methods of
causal inference are openly endorsed, used and debated among economists in,
for instance, econometrics and in economic policy analysis.
Econometrics with or without Theory
Some of the current methodological issues related to causal inference in eco-
nomics follow from the basic motivations behind traditional approaches to
econometrics. Different views about the theoretical foundations of econometric
models have led to significant methodological debates (for some philosophically
informed expositions of the historical and methodological development of
econometrics, see Hendry & Morgan 1995; Hoover, 2012a, 2015; Morgan,
1990, 2001).
The Cowles Commission approach   mainly based on Haavelmo’s (1944)
ideas   is a theory-based approach. The econometric analysis following this
approach presupposes causal connections which are taken from economic the-
ory, represented in a system of equations, and then identifies and measures their
strength by means of statistical tools. If the errors in the system follow definite
probability distributions, and are uncorrelated with each other, then it is possi-
ble to infer parameters for these equations. This is, of course, a very big ‘if’,
and indeed structural modelling of this kind has had serious problems trying to
get the real values of parameters, mainly because of the difficulties in testing
the validity of a priori assumptions (on different assumptions imposed to error
terms and their distinct aims, see Fennell, 2011).
Sims (1980) proposed instead a non-structural characterisation of macro-
econometric models called ‘vector autoregression’ (VAR). In this approach,
every variable is set to be dependent on its own lagged values and on those of
the other variables in the system. The starting presupposition is that everything
could depend on everything, and so the approach has the apparent advantage
of not presupposing any background causal knowledge. However, the system is
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left unidentified, since the dependence relations between the endogenous vari-
ables only reflect correlations. The lack of theoretical presuppositions precludes
the possibility of making counterfactual inferences, which are required, for
instance, to make policy inferences (see Reiss & Cartwright, 2004).
At least some structure was needed to reliably tell causal relations from
mere correlations. Consequently, structural restrictions were added on linear
transformations of the VARs, which resulted in the so-called ‘structural vector
autoregressions’ (SVARs). By imposing the restrictive assumptions, which vary
from model to model, SVARs allow the analysis of structural relations between
contemporaneous variables, and thus they allow a causal identification of the
system (see Hoover, 2005 for more details and contrasts between VARs and
SVARs). Still, the required a priori assumptions introduce again some potential
theoretical bias into the analysis.
The overall issue of interest to philosophers and methodologists can be very
broadly put then as follows: there is a trade-off between including preconceived
theoretical assumptions in econometric analysis and the validity of the causal
inferences that can be made from it. Causal interpretation of econometric mod-
els requires background knowledge about the correct specification of the equa-
tions. On the one hand, too much a priori theory providing the system with
structure yields questions about whether the inferred coefficients actually stand
for real parameters. On the other hand, not enough a priori theory about the
causal structure, the properties of the error terms, and so on, precludes any
meaningful way to make reliable counterfactual inferences from the analysis.
This trade-off has been a topic of methodological debate among applied econo-
mists and econometricians for many years (see, e.g. Hendry, 1980; Hoover,
2013; Hoover & Perez, 2004; Leamer, 1983; Pesarana & Smith, 1995; Wolpin,
2013).
In connection to this debate in econometrics, but also as a contribution to
the available philosophical accounts, Hoover (2001) has put forward an inter-
ventionist account of causality (analogous, but not identical to Pearl’s, 2000; or
to Woodward’s, 2003). Hoover’s proposal focuses on causal structures and on
the inference of causal direction between macroeconomic variables. Given dif-
ferent alternative causal interpretations of systems of equations, for example,
one positing that X causes Y and another that Y causes X, and assuming that
at least one system reflects the true (but unknown) causal order, Hoover’s
method consists in a comparison of the relevant parameters in the systems after
the identification of a structural break (an exogenous and localised interven-
tion). The stability of the parameters in one system after the structural interven-
tion, in contrast to the instability of those in the alternative system, allows the
identification of the right causal direction. To illustrate the proposed structural
test, Hoover uses macroeconomic data to infer the causal direction between
taxes and government spending, and between money and prices (Hoover, 2001,
Chapters 8 and 9). An innovative feature of this project is that it openly takes a
perspectivist approach to causal structure, in which, rather than avoiding the
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use of theoretical assumptions, they are simply made explicit and assessed rela-
tive to their purpose. More recent elaborations of Hoover’s structural approach
are expressly connected to pragmatism and perspectival realism (see, e.g.
Hoover, 2012b, 2012c).
Another philosophically rich approach to econometrics has been put for-
ward by Aris Spanos. In a recent article, Spanos (2012) analyses in detail sev-
eral philosophical/methodological issues in current conventional (textbook)
econometrics. According to Spanos, a large amount of inferences made in com-
mon econometric practice are not justified, because the majority of researchers
are content with poor methodological reflection about the statistical presuppo-
sitions in their models. In particular, he stresses the reticence to properly test
the validity of statistical assumptions about model specification. He charac-
terises the problem as a form of dogmatism of what he calls the pre-eminence
of theory (PET) perspective, which is said to be ‘the methodological framework
that has dominated empirical modelling in economics since Ricardo’ (Spanos,
2012, p. 334). Spanos’s alternative is the so-called ‘error-statistical approach to
empirical induction’, which he has developed and defended for several years in
collaboration with Mayo (see, e.g. Mayo & Spanos, 2010). The error-statistical
view, he argues, can help dealing with most of the methodological problems of
the PET perspective in econometrics (see also Spanos, 1986, 2008, 2010, 2015).
Potential Outcomes and the Design-based Approach
As another reaction to the theory-based approaches to causal inference, some
researchers have turned to design-based econometric analysis. The idea is to
minimise the use of implicit theory to test causal relations by using techniques
similar to those employed in controlled experimental designs. In contrast to
theory-based econometricians, who aim at using structural models to make
counterfactual policy predictions, design-based researchers focus on the causal
interpretation of data to evaluate the outcomes of already existing policy
implementations.
The basic rationale of this approach has been known among statisticians as
the ‘potential outcomes framework’ (see Holland, 1986; Rubin, 1990, 2005).
According to Morgan and Winship (2007), the logic behind the potential out-
comes can be captured by the ‘counterfactual model for data analysis’. Broadly
put, given that there are some well-defined causal states X: x0 and x1, for the
members of a population P, for each unit ui, there are two outcome values Y:
y1 for the outcome of the ‘treatment’ state x1, and y0 for the outcome of the
‘control’ state x0. One of these outcomes is observed for each ui, while the other
is hypothetical or ‘potential’. The causal effect on Y for a single unit is then
defined as the arithmetic difference between the two values (y1  y0). While at
the individual level, both values y1 and y0 cannot be simultaneously observed in
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the same unit, at the aggregate level the expected values E(y1) and E(y0) can be
calculated from observed available data sampled from the relevant population,
and hence it is possible to infer an average causal effect (ACE) ¼ E(y1  y0) ¼
E(y1) E(y0) for the whole population (see Morgan & Winship, 2007,
Chapter 2).
Holland (1986) provides a classical description of the framework and dis-
cusses explicit connections to, and contrasts with, traditional causal theories in
philosophy. More recently, the quasi-experimental approach has been advo-
cated as a ‘mostly harmless econometrics’ (Angrist & Pischke, 2009), in opposi-
tion to ‘harmful’ theory-based approaches, mainly because it avoids the implicit
reliance on a priori theoretical assumptions to isolate and estimate causal
effects. Instead, the design-based approach searches for databases that can be
interpreted and analysed as if the data had been generated by a randomisation
procedure, while any methodological assumption required for the causal infer-
ence is, at least in principle, made as explicit as possible.
The approach has become rather popular among empirical economists in
areas such as development and growth economics (see, e.g. Banerjee, 2007;
Banerjee & Duflo, 2011; Cohen & Easterly, 2009; Söderbom, Teal, Eberhardt,
Quinn, & Zeitlin, 2015). Heckman (2000) offers an analysis of the merits and
problems in the design-based program in contrast to the previous empirical
approaches in econometrics (see also Heckman, 2005). Angrist and Pischke
(2015) discuss and elaborate on the details of the econometric techniques that
are most commonly used in quasi-experimental studies, namely instrumental
variables, regression discontinuity methods and difference-in-differences causal
analysis. These methods are not entirely new, but the causal interpretation of
their results in line with the potential-outcomes logic has just recently become
quite popular in applied social studies and policy evaluations.
Methodological issues concerning the merits and problems of the potential
outcomes framework have so far been mostly debated among social research-
ers. Intense discussions among prominent economists defending and challeng-
ing the approach have appeared in an issue devoted to the estimation of
treatment effects in the Journal of Economic Literature (vol. 48, issue 2, 2010),
and in a symposium (titled: ‘con out of economics’) in the Journal of Economic
Perspectives (vol. 24, issue 2, 2010). Detailed critical expositions of different
methodological aspects related to design-based methods of causal inference are
neatly compiled in the Handbook of Causal Analysis for Social Research, edited
by Morgan (2013), in which, again, most contributors are distinguished applied
social scientists and statisticians.
Topics that can, and perhaps should, be of interest to philosophers
of economics are, for instance: (a) to what extent the design-based approach,
by relying on randomisation, is unbiased in relation to the researchers’
methodological assumptions (e.g. Morgan & Winship, 2007); (b) how the
approach deals or fails to deal with the pervasive heterogeneity present in
almost every relevant dimension of the social realm (e.g. Brand & Thomas, 2013;
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Claveau & Mireles-Flores, 2014; Hong & Raudenbush, 2013; Kuorikoski, 2012);
(c) whether it is enough to know the strength of causal effects without knowing
much or anything about the ‘mechanisms’ responsible for the causal connections
(e.g. Marchionni, 2017; Reiss, 2007; Ruzzene, 2014; Steel, 2013; Weber, 2007);
(d) how useful the research outcomes are for inferring and extrapolating policy
implications, which are frequently meant to affect, not averages among popula-
tions, but specific target units or subpopulations (e.g. Cartwright & Hardie,
2012; Claveau & Mireles-Flores, 2016; Deaton, 2009; Mireles-Flores, 2017;
Olsen, Orr, Bell, & Stuart, 2013; Peters, Langbein, & Roberts, 2017; Ruzzene,
2015) and (e) whether the particular way in which ‘treatments’ are implemented
matters for the efficacy and effectiveness of the causal analysis (e.g. Favereau,
2016; LeRoy, 2016, 2018).
Evidence Diversity and Evidence Amalgamation
Epistemological issues of causal inference are directly connected to questions
about the types and inferential roles of scientific evidence. Inquiries about how
one can reliably acquire causal knowledge overlap with questions about what
counts as good evidence for supporting causal claims and about the problems
and merits of different evidential methods for testing hypotheses. Reiss (2011)
provides a splendid philosophical overview of the different approaches to what
evidence is (‘theories of evidence’), and of the different accounts about how evi-
dence can be said to confirm or refute causal hypotheses (‘theories of
confirmation’).
The debate in economics between theory-based versus design-based econo-
metrics is, in essence, a debate about which methods provide more reliable evi-
dence for telling apart causal connections from spurious correlations (see
Angrist & Pischke, 2010). In a similar vein, philosophers have wondered about
the epistemic value of the different kinds of evidence that practicing scientists
use to confirm or disconfirm causal hypotheses.
The methodological literature on the epistemic value of evidence to test
causal hypotheses occasionally refers to slightly different things when discussing
evidential diversity. Sometimes it means distinct broad kinds, such as probabi-
listic versus mechanistic, quantitative versus qualitative, or theoretical versus
empirical evidence. Other times it means specific results obtained by using dif-
ferent types of evidential methods, such as econometric techniques, experimen-
tal and quasi-experimental designs, observational studies, historical studies,
surveys, simulations, case studies, interviews, and common sense. The relevant
question for social research is: if there are different types of evidence, which
one is the best for supporting scientific causal knowledge?
According to Russo and Williamson (2007) there are at least two types
of evidence commonly available to empirical scientists: probabilistic and
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mechanistic evidence. Furthermore, they suggest   in what has come to be
known as the ‘Russo-Williamson thesis’   that to establish a causal connection,
scientists jointly require probabilistic evidence and evidence for the existence of
a mechanism connecting the cause and the effect. This thesis has been usually
exemplified with cases from health sciences, such as the connection between
smoking and lung cancer (see Gillies, 2011). In contrast, Claveau (2012) has
contended that the Russo-Williamson thesis is a proper characterisation of
standard economic practice, since economists often establish causal claims
using only one kind of evidence. He makes this point by using some examples
taken from recent studies in labour economics.
Endorsing a pluralistic stance about types of evidence, Claveau (2011)
argues as well that the debate between theory-based and design-based econome-
tricians can be better understood as a healthy stage towards accepting the epi-
stemic benefits of diverse co-existing kinds of evidence that are available for
causal induction. But what exactly is the epistemic significance of using diverse
kinds of evidence to support causal hypotheses? Schickore and Coko (2013)
provide an instructive general ‘metaphilosophical’ discussion on the potential
virtues of using diverse means of determination. In the context of econometric
models, Moneta and Russo (2014) elaborate on the implications of evidential
pluralism and argue that it is precisely the ‘integration’ of different types of evi-
dence   in their case, probabilistic and mechanistic   that allows researchers
to make causal interpretations of statistical models. Shaffer (2015) is an illustra-
tion in economics of a form of pluralism (‘structured pluralism’) of methods of
causal analysis of poverty studies. Also with a pluralistic motivation,
Kuorikoski and Marchionni (2016) argue that the use of multiple and indepen-
dent sources of evidence in causal investigation can be understood as a form of
triangulation. Triangulation contributes to the controlling for potential errors
and biases of data-generating procedures, which in turn improves the reliability
of any causal analysis.
Once it is accepted that there are different kinds of evidence, and that they
all have epistemic virtues, new issues arise: how can studies based on different
types of evidence, which yield different or contradictory results, be compared?
When highly different kinds of evidence   say, qualitative and quantitative  
in different studies are being considered, how can the results be meaningfully
integrated? A general evaluation of these questions has been provided by
Stegenga (2013), where he proposes an impossibility theorem of evidence inte-
gration (analogous to Arrow’s impossibility theorem). As a reaction, Lehtinen
(2013) criticises Stegenga’s analogy and argues that the epistemic problems of
evidence amalgamation are not as devastating as Stegenga’s analogy might lead
us to believe.
Methodological problems of evidence diversity and integration have been
much discussed in the context of the so-called evidence-based movement (dis-
cussed below). In the social sciences, evidence integration has also been dis-
cussed within the small academic circles of specific research programs, such as
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the literature on meta-analyses (e.g. Nelson & Kennedy, 2009), meta-
regressions (e.g. Stanley & Jarrell, 2005) and qualitative research methods
(e.g. Major & Savin-Baden, 2011; Morse, 2006; Voils, Sandelowski, Barroso, &
Hasselblad, 2008).
Evidence-based Economics and Evidence for Policy
Since the 1980s, researchers mainly in medical science and later in other disci-
plines have been advocating a more evidence-based approach to scientific prac-
tice. This research standpoint emerged as a reaction against previous research
based either on pure theory or on what were often considered low-quality and
unreliable forms of evidence, including unsystematic experience-based accounts,
common sense, informal conventions, and expert opinion (see Cochrane, 1972;
Guyatt et al., 1992; Petty, 2006; Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, &
Richardson, 1996). The main idea motivating the evidence-based approach is
that empirical sciences should devote more effort to improving and systematis-
ing their evidence-evaluating methods and standards. The aim is to make such
methods and standards as ‘scientific’ as possible, with ‘scientific’ here meaning:
conducive to high levels of accuracy combined with a minimum amount of sub-
jective influence on the research outcomes (see Worrall, 2007).
Most philosophical discussions have focused on probing procedural difficul-
ties related to dealing with evidence diversity, such as: How can we compara-
tively evaluate the epistemic weight of different types of evidence? How can
evidential rankings be objective? Is the best available evidence always the best
in relation to all types of scientific problems? Is all the evidence labelled ‘non-
scientific’ dispensable? (see Ashcroft, 2004; Barton, 2000; Borgerson, 2009;
Howick, 2011; Solomon, 2011; Stegenga, 2011; Worrall, 2002, 2007).
Regarding the original evidence-based movement in medical practice, philo-
sophical criticism has disproportionately focused on the implicit and not thor-
oughly justified view that randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are the best
available type of evidence (together with meta-analyses and systematic reviews
of RCTs). As most critics have argued, it is not obvious why RCTs would nec-
essarily have a higher epistemic weight in comparison to other types of eviden-
tial sources (e.g. Ashcroft, 2004; Borgerson, 2009; Vandenbroucke, 2004, 2008).
Debunking RCTs as the gold standard of empirical evidence has triggered
renewed reflections on the virtues of alternative non-experimental types of evi-
dence, and on the supposedly objective grounds on which evidence rankings are
constructed by proponents of the evidence-based movement. For instance, a
number of studies have appeared on the epistemic virtues of observational stud-
ies (e.g. Benson & Hartz, 2000; Black, 1996), expert knowledge (e.g. Collins &
Evans, 2007; Martini & Boumans, 2014; Selinger & Crease, 2006), case studies
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(e.g. Gerring, 2007; Ruzzene, 2012) and other forms of qualitative evidence
(e.g. Silverman, 2001 [1993]).
In relation to economics, Reiss (2004) has argued specifically for a more
evidence-based economic science, with the intention of supplementing what he
calls a theory-based orthodoxy in current economics. Reiss’s idea is that one
goal of the economic methodologist should be to assess whether causal hypoth-
eses in economics are supported by the best available evidence (of any kind), by
means of using the best available appraisal techniques (to control for potential
sources of error), such that they are more likely be claims about genuine causa-
tion (see Reiss, 2008).
The evidence-based movement has had an obvious influence on economics
in the form of the design-based approach to empirical research, especially in
development economics (see, e.g. Banerjee & Duflo, 2011; Cohen & Easterly,
2009). However, notice that RCTs are not the most common method of causal
inference in economics at all, especially in policy-oriented branches of empirical
economics like health economics, monetary economics, public economics,
labour economics, international trade economics, economic growth and envi-
ronmental economics. Econometric regressions and simulations (theory-based
or otherwise) have for a long time been the preferred evidential tool in most
applied branches of economics. As Swann (2006) suggests, it seems that further
methodological reflection on the potential epistemic benefits of using different
evidential techniques in economics is still required to properly assess whether
current research outputs are indeed supported by the best available evidence.
A widespread idea somewhat connected to the evidence-based approach to
casual analysis is that improving the evidential standards of science by using
the best evidential methods will result in scientific knowledge that is more reli-
able to support practical and policy applications. In the last decades, this idea
has been criticised by philosophers on the grounds that it ignores the several
difficulties of extrapolating policy recommendations from well-established sci-
entific studies to different actual target situations. In particular, Nancy
Cartwright   together with a number of collaborators   has produced a sub-
stantive amount of research exposing and urging for solutions to the ‘external
validity’ issue with scientific results.
Cartwright (1979) was one of the main proponents of the probabilistic
account of causality (together with Skyrms, 1980; Suppes, 1970; Eells, 1991).
More recently she has defended an account of capacities (see Cartwright, 1989,
1998) as the relevant and invariant causal powers responsible for actual mani-
festations of causal effects. Most of her writings on causality during the last
two decades have focused on criticising univocal accounts (see Cartwright,
2007), and some of the modern accounts of causal inference as well, such as
Bayesian nets methods (e.g. Cartwright, 2001) and accounts based on modular-
ity (e.g. Cartwright, 2002). Cartwright’s current position can be taken as a form
of pluralism about the meaning of causation (see Cartwright, 2004). More
recently, she has written on the use of scientific evidence for policy purposes or
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what she labels ‘evidence-based policy’ (see, e.g. Cartwright, 2009; Cartwright
& Hardie, 2012; Cartwright & Stegenga, 2011).
In Cartwright’s view, the evidence-based movement fails to provide a good
basis for effective policy by wrongly placing a great deal of trust on particular
evidential methods, such as randomised controlled trials (see Cartwright, 2009,
2010). The evidence-based movement claims that RCTs are good evidence to
support claims about implementing ‘T in order to bring about outcome O’, but
Cartwright argues that RCTs only support ‘claims of one particular form,
essentially, “T causes O in particular circumstances X in particular population
Φ”’ (2009, p. 129). But if one wants to bring about the outcome O in a
completely different population, how can one be sure that T will be effective
there as well?
Cartwright and many others often refer to this issue as the external validity
problem: ‘for what other populations can we expect these same conclusions to
hold?’ (2006b, p. 986). Is it possible to extrapolate a valid causal result obtained
in a particular setting to a different setting and expect the same result to obtain
(see also Bareinboim & Pearl, 2013; Grüne-Yanoff, 2016; Olsen et al., 2013;
Peters et al., 2017; Ruzzene, 2015; Steel, 2010)? The possibility of extrapolating
causal results for policy purposes is of course a concern that affects most, if not
all, empirical methods of causal inference (see Mireles-Flores, 2016).
What are, then, the evidential requirements that a well-ordered science
should follow in order to achieve reliable extrapolation of policy results?
Cartwright’s main aim in her most recent contributions has been to develop an
account about how to deal with ‘external validity’ for policy purposes by taking
into consideration all the contextual causal conditions (enabling and disturbing
factors) that are relevant for the causal effect to obtain (see Cartwright &
Efstathiou, 2011). The most recent outcome of this project can be found in her
book with Hardie (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012). According to Marcellesi
(2015), Cartwright and Hardie have in fact succeeded to a great extent in deal-
ing with the problem of external validity, by characterising the conditions under
which it is allowed to predict, from the truth of a causal claim in one situation,
its truth in a different situation. It remains to be seen whether this type of
account can be implemented (and to which extent) in actual practice.
BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS
Behavioural economics is an approach developed during the 1980s by aca-
demics who judged the psychological assumptions of mainstream economics as
unacceptably unrealistic. The disputed content were the core assumptions of
rational choice theory, which constituted the central foundations of mainstream
economic theory at the time. The emergence of this approach was instigated by
a ‘cognitive revolution’ in psychology, whereby researchers challenged the
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traditional ‘behaviourist’ stance, and began developing computational models
of individuals’ mental representations and learning processes (see Nagatsu,
2015a). Motivated by the advances in psychology, researchers in microeconom-
ics started taking seriously the emerging empirical evidence undermining stan-
dard assumptions about human rationality, and subsequently tried replacing
such assumptions with the most recent empirically grounded findings from
experimental cognitive sciences.
The proponents of the behavioural approach held that making more realistic
‘the psychological underpinnings of economic analysis will improve the field
[…] generating theoretical insights, making better predictions […], and suggest-
ing better policy’ (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004, p. 3). Consequently, most
methodological inquiries about behavioural economics have focused on
whether the approach has lived up to its epistemic expectations in terms of
yielding better explanations, predictions and interventions.
Angner and Loewenstein (2012) describe three phases in the development of
behavioural economics: first, a period of acceptance and assimilation of the sur-
mounting empirical results which identified anomalies and inconsistencies in
standard rationality theory, such as preference reversals, loss-aversion, framing
effects, hyperbolic discounting, and anchoring effects (e.g. Thaler, 1981;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981). Second, a period of development of novel
economic theory upon the basis of new empirically grounded assumptions
about rationality and about individual human behaviour (e.g. Akerlof, 2002;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rabin, 1993; Starmer, 2000; Thaler, 1980, 1985).
And third, a still ongoing phase characterised by attempts to apply insights
from behavioural economics to public policy (e.g. Diamond & Vartiainen,
2007; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). For some comprehensive accounts of the his-
tory and development of behavioural economics, see the edited volume by
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004) or Angner’s (2012) introduction to
behavioural economics. Heukelom (2014) has written an ambitious book
describing in detail the different historical stages of behavioural economics. In
a much more concise piece, Nagatsu (2015a) reviews the distinct methodologi-
cal waves of the approach and describes some of the main criticisms to its most
recent developments.
A number of methodologically rich studies on the history and implications
of the ‘cognitive’ approach to economics have appeared in recent years. For
instance, Esther-Mirjam Sent’s (2004) article on the interactions between psy-
chology and economics is a historical piece with a strong focus on the progress
(and twists) in the genealogy of behavioural economics. Bruni and Sugden’s
(2007) text is an appraisal of Pareto’s influence on the separation of scientific
economics from psychological presuppositions in modern neoclassical theory.
In an article motivated by Mark Blaug’s methodological ideas, Dow (2013)
evaluates whether the ‘new’ behavioural economics research program is ‘pro-
gressive’ or ‘degenerative’ (in Popperian/Lakatosian terms) in relation to main-
stream economics. Małecka and Nagatsu (2018) aim at characterising the
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influence of behavioural economics on consumer law scholarship, and to do so,
they start by offering an illuminating description of the evolving stages of the
research, first in psychology, and then, in economics.
The attempt to provide economic theory with more solid empirical founda-
tions involved discussions about the validity of alternative methods to those of
standard theoretical neoclassical economics, such as thought and laboratory
experiments, field and natural experiments, and computer simulations (see
Angner & Loewenstein, 2012, pp. 668 675; Boumans, 2016; Guala & Mittone,
2005). In a review of the already mentioned volume Advances in Behavioural
Economics (Camerer et al., 2004), Fudenberg (2006) offers an early critical
assessment of the whole approach and points out a number of problematic
aspects related to generalizing the validity of its results.
In recent years, the methodological discussions in relation to behavioural
economics have focused mainly on four broad topics: (a) the viability and epi-
stemic merits of neuroeconomics, (b) whether behavioural economics is truly an
alternative to neoclassical economics or only a more sophisticated variation of
it, (c) the appraisal of the normative and ethical implications of the behavioural
approach to welfare economics and to (d) public policy in the form of so-called
libertarian paternalism.
Neuroeconomics
The main idea inspiring neuroeconomics is to use the most recent neuroscien-
tific evidence and tools to study the neural foundations of economic choice
behaviour. The project of combining neuroscience with economics has moti-
vated questions about the feasibility, epistemic virtues and consequences of
methodological interdisciplinarity. Most contributions have focused on ques-
tions such as: How are the methods in economics affected or enriched by neu-
roscience? Is there any real improvement in economic knowledge and
understanding after the introduction of neuroscientific results in economics?
What is the real impact of neuroeconomics in relation to traditional methodo-
logical issues in economics, for example, realisticness of models, explanatory
relevance, and predictive power of economic science?
Some noteworthy methodological contributions are the following. Harrison
(2008) offers an appraisal of the potential of neuroeconomics, and argues
that   at least up to 2008   the approach was marketed and sold as achieving
much more than was really the case. Mäki (2010) exposes and comments on the
rhetorical strategies used in neuroeconomics. Vromen (2010) reflects on how
unsurprising some ‘surprising’ neuroeconomics findings are. Ross (2012) offers
a neat overall description of the project, while being rather critical of its
achievements. Fumagalli (2013) elucidates on how neuroeconomics has tried to
inform theory on the foundations of welfare economics. And Clarke (2014)
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evaluates arguments in favour of and against neuroeconomics in relation to dis-
tinct interpretations of what the aims of economics are.
In the last decade, there have been at least three special issues devoted to
philosophical and methodological appraisals of neuroeconomics: an issue in
Economics and Philosophy (2008, vol. 24, issue 3), another in the Journal of
Economic Methodology (2010, vol. 17, issue 2) and one more in Biology and
Philosophy (2011, vol. 26, issue 5). The majority of the methodological assess-
ments of neuroeconomics have tended to be rather negative, at least, in relation
to the relevance of neuroscientific studies to the progress in economics: ‘more
hype than substance’ seems to be the consensus (see Marchionni & Vromen,
2012). Still, there are authors who have focused on some positive features as
well. For instance, Herrmann-Pillath (2016) uses the case of neuroeconomics to
argue in favour of developing constitutive explanations (which in turn account
for the role of mechanisms) in the integration of economics and the
neurosciences.
A clear and insightful article on the current methodological debates in
neuroeconomics is Fumagalli’s (2016b) ‘Five theses on neuroeconomics’. He
formulates questions and provides answers to the following controversial issues:
(1) Does neuroeconomics achieve unification? (2) Is the standard economic
theory improved thanks to neuroscientific results? (3) Do neuroeconomics’ find-
ings advance model selection in economics? (4) Which other disciplines enrich
neuroeconomics’ accounts of choice? (5) Does neuroeconomics amount to an
expansion of the evidential base of economic theory?
Is Behavioural Economics Different from Neoclassical Economics?
As some commentators have suggested, the success of behavioural economics is
to a great extent a consequence of an innovative scientific interdisciplinary
exchange plus a good rhetoric (e.g. Angner, 2014; Nagatsu, 2015a).
Behavioural economists have indeed accomplished the introduction of exciting
empirical insights from cognitive sciences into economics, while at the same
time adopting the basic concepts, language and modelling techniques of main-
stream economics to present their results, rather than radically departing from
the prevailing neoclassical theoretical attitude. After several Nobel prizes
awarded to the pioneers of the approach and the increasing endorsement of
behavioural public policies, some authors understandably wonder: But how
revolutionary is behavioural economics really?
Rubinstein (2003) has questioned the innovativeness of behavioural eco-
nomics, particularly in the treatment of hyperbolic discounting. Basically,
Rubinstein fails to see the concrete psychological input in the revised models. A
proper attempt at combining ‘economics and psychology’, he argues, would
require opening the black box of the individual decision makers, instead of
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simply modifying and developing more sophisticated mathematical formal
accounts, totally in line with the neoclassical style.
More recently, Berg and Gigerenzer (2010) have claimed that all branches of
behavioural economics are in spirit just neoclassical economics in disguise. Their
point is that the new revised accounts to characterise human behaviour do not
refer to any proper empirically grounded psychological processes in order to
explain the data under investigation. Instead, the new approaches mainly rely on
as-if justifications for their psychological presuppositions, which in Berg and
Gigerenzer’s view renders them essentially indistinguishable from the standard
neoclassical accounts of which they were supposed to be an improvement.
Ross (2014a, 2014b) makes a similar criticism, but with a different emphasis.
According to him, behavioural economics might wind up being just a branch of
psychology, since it does not really engage with proper economic phenomena.
Broadly put, the criticism is that using insights from psychology   such as
accounts of the psychological dispositions of individuals   to characterise util-
ity functions for representative agents precludes researchers from answering the
questions of real interests in economics, specifically: How to model and estimate
the structure of aggregate heterogeneous behaviour from available macroeco-
nomic data sets? Most economists, according to Ross, are mainly concerned
with, say, aggregate consumer behaviour (perhaps taking into account different
representative consumer types), while the psychological dynamics going on in
the mind of any particular consumer are only of secondary relevance.
As Nagatsu (2015a) argues, behavioural economists currently lack
acceptable responses to all these criticisms, namely: to those who question the
substance of the psychological inputs into economic theorising, to those who
question the usefulness of the project to account for relevant economic phenom-
ena, and to the general question of how exactly behavioural economics differs
from (or improves upon) standard neoclassical modelling practices in
economics.
Behavioural Welfare Economics
One reason for the rapidly growing popularity of behavioural economics is that
it allegedly has some obvious and direct normative and policy implications of
public interest. Understanding the psychology of choice-makers in a more real-
istic manner is said to be useful for designing more effective and efficient social
policies and institutions. This has been the case, for instance, in relation to
inter-temporal inconsistencies in saving behaviour, about individuals’ percep-
tions of financial risk, or about labour behaviour and how workers perceive
inflation and different risks (see Kopcke, Little, & Tootell, 2003; Laibson et al.,
1998).
The normative implications of behavioural economics have been predomi-
nantly discussed in connection to what is sometimes called behavioural welfare
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economics. Broadly put, the systematic anomalies in relation to the standard
assumptions of instrumental rationality which have been found since the 1980s
(i.e. preference reversals, loss-aversion, framing effects, hyperbolic discounting,
and anchoring effects) have cast doubt not only on standard rational choice
and microeconomic theory, but also on the ‘standard methods of normative
analysis’ traditionally employed in welfare economics. According to McQuillin
and Sugden (2012), the fundamental theorems of welfare economics are based
on the typical assumptions about coherent individual preferences in line with
instrumental rationality. Therefore, the behavioural ‘anomalies’ that represent
a challenge to rationality, are also a challenge to the standards by which
applied welfare economics determines which goals are socially desirable. Thus,
as McQuillin and Sugden suggest, there is an indirect tension between the
results of recent empirical research on behavioural economics and the outcomes
of applied welfare economics (or any normative method of policy evaluation
based on welfare economics).
The methodological discussion related to the purported problems of norma-
tive economics has focused either on the ontology of preferences and other
mental states which are said to determine economic behaviour (e.g. Angner,
2018; Dietrich & List, 2016; Guala, 2012, 2017; Hands, 2012; Hausman, 2012;
Infante, Lecouteux, & Sugden, 2016) or on the normative justifications of
public policy standards of what social ‘welfare’ is assumed to involve, such as,
wellbeing (e.g. Kahneman & Sugden, 2005), liberty (e.g. Sugden, 2007, 2008),
autonomy (e.g. Hausman & Welch, 2010, Mills, 2015, Nagatsu, 2015b, Pinto-
Prades & Abellan-Perpiñan, 2012).
A much less discussed issue of methodological interest is the shift that theo-
ries of rationality underwent from a descriptive to a normative status after the
initial behavioural anomalies emerged (see Hands, 2015b; Herfeld, 2017).
Recently, Małecka (2017) has questioned the very idea that a theory can simul-
taneously be intended to be explanatorily adequate and normative. Yet beha-
vioural economics, she argues, seems to be proposing a better descriptive
account of behaviour, while at the same time conceding on the use of expected
utility theory for normative purposes.
Libertarian Paternalism
A rather noticeable consequence of the cognitive movement in economics has
been its impact on actual public policy debates, especially in relation to what
has been called libertarian paternalism, or ‘nudging’. Moreover, it is clear that
books like Nudge (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) and Animal Spirits (Akerlof &
Shiller, 2009) have contributed to the widespread popularity of behavioural
economics and their policy potential. As a consequence, academic and non-
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academic discussions about nudging policies and their philosophical and ethical
implications have proliferated.
Libertarian paternalism is the use of policy interventions to subtly influence
people’s choices, such that they end up choosing options that would make them
better off. The intervention takes place without imposing any restrictions
directly on the individuals’ choice behaviour, but rather by intervening on the
context or environment of choice, called ‘choice architectures’. Nudging is
based on the overwhelming amount of empirical evidence about failures and
anomalies of traditional theories of rationality. Different choice architectures
are expected to influence individual behaviour by prompting the biases and
heuristics that individual agents commonly employ in real world choice situa-
tions, allegedly without inflicting any restriction on the individuals’ freedom to
choose among available alternatives. Osman (2016) provides a clear overall dis-
cussion of the general aims, problems and defences of the approach.
Not surprisingly, ethical questions with regard to this approach have ignited
philosophical debate. Behavioural findings have shown that individuals often
fail to make the best choices for their own benefit. Nudge policies are meant to
remedy that ‘problematic’ situation, and thus in principle help people be better
off according to their own preferences. But, how can the policy maker know
what the best is for people? (e.g. Anderson, 2010; Bovens, 2009). More specifi-
cally, how can the nudge architect be sure to properly account for what individ-
ual choice-makers actually prefer (e.g. Guala & Mittone, 2015)?
Is nudging really respectful of individual liberty? How much libertarian pater-
nalism actually intrudes or restricts the liberty of choice-makers by employing a
form of subtle manipulation (e.g. Hausman & Welch, 2010; Nagatsu, 2015b;
Wilkinson, 2013)? Would it not be better, instead of nudging individuals, to
boost them via ‘rational persuasion’ (e.g. Hausman & Welch, 2010)? Are nudge
policies intruding on the autonomy of individuals? How much of the policy
maker’s will is imposed on the individuals (e.g. Grüne-Yanoff, 2012; Reiss, 2013,
Chapter 15)? In a clarifying assessment of most of the debate, Heilmann (2014)
provides a systematic characterisation and typology for nudges. Moreover, he
proposes, first, a set of conceptual conditions that are necessary and sufficient for
nudges to be successful, and second, further practical conditions for successful
implementation, transparency and justification of nudging policies.
REFERENCES
Akerlof, G. A. (2002). Behavioral macroeconomics and macroeconomic behavior. The American
Economic Review, 92(3), 411 433.
Akerlof, G. A., & Shiller, R. J. (2009). Animal spirits: How human psychology drives the economy,
and why it matters for global capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Alexandrova, A. (2006). Connecting economic models to the real world: Game theory and the FCC
spectrum auctions. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 36(2), 173 192.
115Recent Trends in Economic Methodology
Alexandrova, A. (2008). Making models count. Philosophy of Science, 75(3), 383 404.
Alexandrova, A., & Northcott, R. (2009). Progress in economics: Lessons from the spectrum auc-
tions. In H. Kincaid & D. Ross (Eds.), The Oxford handbook for philosophy of economics (pp.
306 336). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Alexandrova, A., & Northcott, R. (2013). It’s just a feeling: Why economic models do not explain.
Journal of Economic Methodology, 20(3), 262 267.
Anderson, J. (2010). Review of ‘Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness’.
Economics and Philosophy, 26(3), 369 376.
Angner, E. (2012). A course in behavioural economics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Angner, E. (2014). ‘To navigate safely in the vast sea of empirical facts’: Ontology and methodology
in behavioral economics. Synthese, 192(11), 3557 3575.
Angner, E. (2018). What preferences really are. Philosophy of Science, (Forthcoming).
Angner, E., & Loewenstein, G. (2012). Behavioral economics. In U. Mäki (Ed.), Handbook of the
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change. Theory and decision library, (Vol. 42, pp. 207 219). Dordrecht: Springer.
116 LUIS MIRELES-FLORES
Brand, J. E., & Thomas, J. S. (2013). Causal effect heterogeneity. In S. L. Morgan (Ed.), Handbook
of causal analysis for social research (pp. 189 213). Dordrecht: Springer.
Bruni, L., & Sugden, R. (2007). The road not taken: How psychology was removed from economics,
and how it might be brought back. The Economic Journal, 117(516), 146 173.
Camerer, C. F., & Loewenstein, G. (2004). Behavioral economics: Past, present, future. In C. F.
Camerer, G. Loewenstein, & M. Rabin (Eds.), Advances in behavioral economics (pp. 3 51).
New York, NY: Princeton University Press.
Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G., & Rabin, M. (Eds.). (2004). Advances in behavioral economics.
New York, NY: Princeton University Press.
Campaner, R., & Galavotti, M. C. (2007). Plurality in causality. In P. Machamer & G. Wolters
(Eds.), Thinking about causes: From Greek philosophy to modern physics (pp. 178 199).
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Cartwright, N. D. (1979). Causal laws and effective strategies. Noûs, 13(4), 419 437.
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nomics, Vol. 13 of D. M. Gabbay, P. Thagard, & J. Woods (Eds.), The handbook of the phi-
losophy of science (pp. 89 113). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Hoover, K. D. (2012b). Causal structure and hierarchies of models. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 43(4), 778 786.
Hoover, K. D. (2012c). Pragmatism, perspectival realism, and econometrics. In A. Lehtinen, J.
Kuorikoski, & P. Ylikoski (Eds.), Economics for real: Uskali Mäki and the place of truth in
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